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This paper aims to examine Advance Decisions to Refuse Treatment (ADRTs) in the 
context of the COVID-19 pandemic. We consider the development of ADRTs, the 
lack of take up and confusion among the general public, clinicians and health and 
social care staff.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper is a conceptual piece that reflects on ADRTs in the particular context of 
COVID-19. It considers professional concerns and pronouncements on ADRTs.
Findings
ADRTs have a low take up currently. There is misunderstanding among public and 
professionals. There is a need for raising awareness, developing practice and a need to 
allay fears of misuse and abuse of ADRTs in clinical, health and social care settings.
Originality
This paper is original in considering ADRTs as a safeguarding issue from two 
perspectives: that of the person making the ADRT and being confident in respect for 
the decisions made, and of clinicians and other professionals being reflexively aware 
of the need to accept advance decisions and not acting according to unconscious 
biases in times of crisis.
Practical implications
We make recommendations that reflexive training and awareness becomes the norm 
in health and social care, that reform of ADRTs is undertaken to prevent 
misunderstandings and that the person becomes central in all decision-making 
processes.
Keywords
COVID-19, ADRTs, ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ notices, marginalised groups
Introduction
When COVID-19 began to take hold in the UK and people became seriously ill, 
concerns increased regarding the National Health Service’s (NHS) capacity to manage 
the anticipated rise in demands. Alarm was raised that older people, people with 
disabilities and those with pre-existing conditions or weakened by ill-health might 
automatically be assigned ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ or ‘Do Not Attempt CPR’ 
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(DNACPR) notices. Anxieties were also expressed about Advance Decisions to 
Refuse Treatment (ADRTs), reflecting misunderstandings about their nature and 
function.
The ramifications of such a battlefield triage mentality were recognised and media 
reports circulated concerning the active discrimination underpinning this whilst 
recognising that choice through advance directives might have much to offer in this 
situation. The unspoken discourses underpinning these fears reveal a safeguarding 
issue that permeates society and health and social care services and constructs taken-
for-granted assumptions of best practice and best interests (see Bourdieu, 1977; 
Parker, forthcoming). As well as misunderstandings, the lack of take-up of ADRTs 
reflects anxieties about power being wrested from the self by others within families or 
by over-stretched clinicians. Moreover, a lack of respect for ADRTs by health 
professionals demonstrates a social appropriation of safeguarding from the person to 
the professional expert, which also needs to be addressed.
When we examine the demography of people who have died from COVID-19, it 
reflects some of the unconscious thinking that denotes an adult safeguarding issue at a 
macro level. The numbers of older people, people with pre-existing conditions and 
disabilities, people from BAME communities and working-class people who have 
died are disproportionately represented when compared with other groups in society.
The terrible nature and effects of radical intervention and intubation and the enduring 
effects of COVID-19 infection post-ICU for those who survive have led some to 
conclude that perhaps people would rather have died. This has led to unethical actions 
in suggesting that treatment should be unequally provided, again raising safeguarding 
needs. Questions of decisions to withhold treatment for pragmatic reasons have the 
potential to affect the making of an advanced decision to refuse treatment (ADRT). 
The fear being that such a decision may be more readily assumed when there is still 
the possibility of effective curative treatments or when clinicians are stretched and 
faced with rationing treatments, or the ADRT addresses a different situation to that 
specified within it.
In the context of adult safeguarding, this paper considers the development of ADRTs 
and their potential to assist both clinicians and people with COVID-19, adding a 
moral perspective to treatment decisions in the light of our current knowledge of 
COVID-19. It moves us from a potentially abusive situation of scant regard for those 
deemed ‘vulnerable’ because of certain characteristics – age, pre-existing health 
condition, intellectual or cognitive disability and so on – to a changed state in which 
expressed wishes can be transparently shared across family members and health care 
professionals (hence the metamorphosis implied in the title.) Thus ADRTs can disrupt 
the tendency towards convergence around assumed wants and wishes to personal and 
diverse decisions based on prior stated wishes (Beckert, 2010).
COVID-19 and defining adult abuse
When we think of adult safeguarding, conscious reasoning suggests to us notions of 
physical, psychological, financial, sexual abuse, and neglect (Penhale and Parker, 
2020). Whilst No Secrets (Department of Health, 2000) included reference to 
discriminatory abuse, this and the allied concept of structural abuse has been little 
considered. The Care Act 2014 has consolidated definitions of abuse and its breadth is 
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helpful when considering safeguarding in a time of COVID. If it is the in-grained 
concept of our evaluations of the ‘other’ and differences in society that creates the 
conditions for adult abuse to occur, we have an imperative to identify and address 
underlying the socio-structural aspects of abuse, including those which permeate 
popular and clinical understandings of ADRTs and associated directives. The 
safeguarding issues raised are bi-directional. ADRTs are misunderstood and 
assumptions are made that ‘best interest’ decisions can be applied by experts against 
individuals’ wishes. On the other hand, awareness of and possible reform to the 
making of advance decisions may offer an enhanced means of safeguarding in 
difficult times.
COVID-19 has drawn our attention to domestic abuse under lockdown but has 
perhaps occluded our focus on wider abusive structural factors that may have a 
significant impact on risk and well-being.  Most current social and health policy and 
practice development in the UK draws upon normative assumptions; a hidden, taken-
for-granted-ness (Parker, forthcoming). However, policy developments often have 
unintended and ‘hidden’ consequences (Merton, 1936). So years of retrenchment in 
public spending and health service reform led to a lack of intensive care equipment, 
personal protective equipment and failure to implement prior planning for pandemics 
(Henley, 2020). There was a lack of appropriate government guidance in dealing with 
an emergency and, as a result, the important consideration of triage when facing the 
COVID-19 emergency. What began, perhaps, as a stretched service’s approach to an 
oncoming crisis brought to attention the socially constructed risks of being placed in 
particular categories and a philosophical dilemma of where, how and to whom to 
allocate scant resources. This represents a safeguarding issue at policy, practice and 
personal levels.
Unintended consequences have been recognised for a considerable time (Merton, 
1936). Mitigating these is, however, problematic (Urry, 2016). Excavating the norms 
on which thinking is based prior to the formulation of policy and the active 
participation of citizens can offset some of these issues. It is our contention that a 
campaign of raising awareness about and encouraging the use of ADRTs can assist in 
protecting the rights of individuals and in creating a moral base for triage assessments 
in future pandemic and emergency situations. They guard against potential 
discriminatory abuse as well as the physical and psychological abuses sometimes 
associated with poor treatment decisions and practices.
ADRTs and the refusal of medical treatment
Individuals with capacity have the right to give or withhold consent to medical 
treatment (Lynch, 2011). The Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 sets out mechanisms 
whereby people who lose capacity can also have their decisions respected. Alongside 
ADRTs are Lasting Powers of Attorney for Personal Welfare (LPA) and Court 
Appointed Deputies. The latter two are forms of substituted decision making whereby 
someone else is given the legal authority to make decisions about the individual but 
acting within one of the foundational principles of the MCA which is that anyone 
making decisions on someone else’s behalf must be acting in that person’s best 
interests (MCA 2005 s1 (5); see also Baroness Hale in Aintree University Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust (Respondent) v James (Appellant) [2013] UKSC 67 paragraph 
45). 
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ADRTs were introduced into the MCA in an attempt ‘to codify and clarify the current 
common law rules’ (Department for Constitutional Affairs & Department of Health, 
2005, para 84), although it was recognised that many people, including professionals, 
had ‘deep rooted personal, moral, religious and ethical views’ that needed to be 
addressed (Lord Chancellor’s Department, 1997, para 4.2). Despite the safeguards 
which the government attempted to introduce into ADRT, those views did not 
necessarily dissolve for all clinicians. A headline from the London Evening Standard 
(2007) published the day before the new law came into force stated, ‘We'll fight 
backdoor euthanasia and risk jail say doctors’, reflecting some doctors’ and health 
care professionals’ perspectives who found the topic extremely emotive. This echoes 
an experience had by one of the authors (Lyne) who, during a training event in 2006, 
was told, very firmly, by a senior member of nursing staff that she had ‘come into 
nursing to save lives, not to let people die’. Current fears, however, reflect a reverse 
concern that decisions will be made to refuse treatment and allow death of certain 
groups based on discriminatory assumptions of treatment viability (Alzheimer’s 
Society, 2020). ADRTs would allow for ethical discussion and decision-making.
ADRTs are set out in sections 24-26 of the MCA. They can only be made by persons 
over 18 who have capacity at the time of making. ADRTs have to be both ‘valid’ and 
‘applicable’. For instance, an ADRT would not be valid if the person has withdrawn 
it, has made a subsequent LPA conferring the relevant powers to the Attorney, or has 
acted in anyway which is inconsistent with the terms of the decision (MCA, 2005, s25 
[2a, b, c]). An ADRT would not be applicable if:
i. the person is capable of making the decision at the time it needs to be 
made, 
ii. it applies to treatments not specified in the decision, 
iii. conditions specified in the decision are absent 
iv. there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the current circumstances were 
not anticipated and if they had been this might have altered the person’s 
intent. 
The applicability criterion is particularly relevant to the situation at the outset of the 
pandemic. In addition, whilst ADRTs can be made verbally, if the ADRT is in 
relation to life sustaining treatment then it must be written down, witnessed by a third 
party and contain a statement to the effect that ‘this advance decision stands even if 
my life is at risk’ MCA 2005 s25 [5] & [6]). In relation to the COVID-19 situation, it 
is likely that most ADRT would have to be written in this form in order to prove 
effective. SCIE (2020) argue that it is unlikely that people could write ADRTs in 
relation to COVID-19 testing as this is not treatment but any expressed wishes would 
need to be taken into consideration if making a best interest decision.
Section 24(1) MCA 2005 articulates the effects of an advance decision in empowering 
people to refuse specified treatments when they lose the capacity to give or refuse 
consent to it. Section 26 (1) states that making an advance decision that is valid and 
applicable has the same power as a decision made at the time by someone with 
capacity.  Health care practitioners are bound to it regardless of whether it is 
considered unwise.
However, there are criticisms of ADRT (Morris et al., 2017). On a practical level, it is 
clear that ADRTs will not work if the maker does not tell anyone of their existence.  
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The Code of Practice (2008, para 9.38) sets out ways in which the existence of an 
ADRT can be checked including recording the decision in healthcare records or 
carrying a card. Recording the decision in healthcare notes, however, is not infallible 
(Paduano, 2017).
Poor understanding of ADRTs among health care practitioners is also seen to hamper 
their effectiveness (House of Lords, 2014). However, it is with the onset of the 
pandemic, concerns were raised that advance decisions, especially with DNACPR 
notices attached were being adopted in a blanket fashion for certain groups deemed 
‘vulnerable’ to the effects of COVID-19. This suggests a misunderstanding of ADRTs 
underpinned by an ‘expert’ allocation of certain groups into categories for no 
treatment that removes the voice and rights of the individual and becomes a serious 
safeguarding issue to protect people from the actions of those trusted to care for them. 
Michalowski (2005, p.959) points out that ignoring ADRTs or misunderstanding them 
can result in ‘an invasion of his or her bodily integrity’. Concern about this grew with 
the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) Chief Executive quoted as saying, ‘In 
recent weeks I have been disturbed by reports of blanket DNACPR orders being 
applied to groups of people without their involvement or any individual assessment of 
their needs. This is completely unacceptable’ (Jones-Berry 2020). The NMC and 
General Medical Council issued a joint statement prohibiting such actions. This was 
followed by a further joint statement from the British Medical Association (BMA), 
Care Provider Alliance (CPA), Care Quality Commission (CQC) and the Royal 
College of General Practice (RCGP) who reiterated ‘It is unacceptable for advance 
care plans, with or without DNAR form completion to be applied to groups of people 
of any description’ (RCGP, 2020). Millington Sanders (2020) provided clear question 
and answer advice in her blog for the Royal College of General Practitioners to offset 
these misunderstandings and to enable individuals to make ADRTs in an informed 
and non-pressured way. Ruck Keene’s (2020) analysis of decision-making in a time 
of COVID recognises the complexities and misinterpretations that may occur. 
However, he argues that supported decisions may have a greater role in effecting 
positive  outcomes and respect for those individual decisions.
Addressing misunderstandings and lack of knowledge of ADRTs will help offset 
some problems and help to safeguard adults. However, the lack of standardised 
practice acts as another potential risk. Because ADRTs for non-life sustaining 
treatment can be made verbally and also perhaps because there is no recognised 
national format for written ADRTs, there is no national record of either the numbers 
or types of ADRT in existence beyond estimates. Kitzinger and Kitzinger (2016) 
recommend 10 ways in which the uptake and use of ADRTs in Wales could be 
promoted including the use of standardised quality-controlled forms and electronic 
upload to the Welsh care record. There is no reason why these recommendations 
shouldn’t apply equally to England. One of the barriers to uptake identified in this 
report is that some people are sceptical about an ADRT being effective in practice, 
worrying that professionals may simply ignore what is written or be unaware of the 
ADRT’s existence.
Access to them would seem to be a particular problem in a fast moving and ever-
changing clinical environment as recently seen during the pandemic.  How does a 
clinician balance the urgent lifesaving tasks with the need to see the patient as an 
individual? This is, perhaps, where advance care planning could really have an 





























































The Journal of Adult Protection
impact, whilst at the moment it seems that ADRTs are used to make practitioner-led 
decisions based on unconscious biases of usefulness of life and value of life rather 
than appropriately seeking the voice of the person (Curtis et al., 2020). It would also 
add an important dimension of moral rather than clinical and evidence-based 
decision-making that is so important for end-of-life-care (Coulthard, 2020). 
Emanuel et al. (2020) argue that the time constraints experienced in pandemic 
treatment counts against taking quality of life and quality adjusted life years into 
account. They argue that priority for treatment should be given to patients with a 
reasonable life expectancy although they don’t attempt to define what “reasonable” 
means in this context. They also argue that  “…encouraging all patients, especially 
those facing the prospect of intensive care, to document in an advance care directive 
what future quality of life they would regard as acceptable and when they would 
refuse ventilators or other life-sustaining interventions can be appropriate.” (p2052)
Curtis et al. (2020) recognise the importance of addressing questions of ADRT and 
DNRCPR notices following COVID-19 and candidly recognise that the pandemic has 
led to an increase in discussion, at least, of DNR notices written by responsible 
clinicians in the USA. The dangers in an over-stretched NHS hospital are rife. They 
recommend moving towards a system of informed assent and having such 
conversations with relatives and loved ones if it is no longer possible to speak with 
the patient. This accords with the court’s decision in R (Tracey) v Cambridge 
University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust & Ors. Such conversations also go some 
way towards safeguarding the patient’s rights under Article 8 European Convention 
on Human Rights as outlined in Winspear v City Hospitals Sunderland NHS 
Foundation Trust.
Drawing an analogy from theology, we can identify two separate approaches in 
assumptions made about ADRTs that have a bearing on adult safeguarding. A 
kataphatic approach (what can be said) recognises the stated directive and decision of 
individuals in certain circumstances through an express ADRT. An apophatic 
approach (what cannot be said) demands we do not make assumptions about people’s 
wishes where there is no ADRT. If we are to develop advance decisions and clinical 
practice in ways that safeguard individuals from unwanted treatments, or from the 
withdrawal of treatments where this has not been clearly stated, we need to improve 
the accessibility and visibility of individual decisions and to note the specificity of 
ADRTs. A more explicit approach is necessary.
Ways forward for the future
The Recommended Summary Plan for Emergency Care and Treatment (ReSPECT) 
(Resuscitation Council UK, no date) is increasingly being adopted across healthcare 
providers. It provides a basis for advanced informed consent, and a discussion of 
informed assent later. ReSPECT emphasises that the heart of the process is a 
conversation between the patient/ patient’s family and the clinicians. This 
conversation is then recorded so that everyone knows what decisions are acceptable 
should the patient lose capacity. It is especially relevant for clinical decision-making 
which, as we have seen in COVID-19, is often undertaken under considerable 
pressure. Whilst not being an ADRT in its own right, ReSPECT can lead to an 
advanced care plan which contains details of the patient’s wishes, the clinical 
recommendations for care and an agreed DNACPR decision where appropriate and is 
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recommended by Millington Sanders (2020). This partnership type working is far 
more attuned to the ethos of the MCA, aspects of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the Care Act 2014 and Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2015.
The RCUK stress on their website that ReSPECT can be for anyone but will have 
increasing relevance for those who are seriously unwell. This highlights part of the 
problem with the current process of ADRT and advanced care planning: generally 
these decisions are often only made at a stage when the person is already unwell or 
has received a diagnosis. Perhaps there needs to be a societal change which embraces 
discussions regarding life including illness and death and steps taken earlier to outline 
one’s own preferences. This would allow clinicians and health and social care 
practitioners to make informed and ethical decisions in respect of people in high-risk 
groups facing illnesses such as COVID-19 and will move away from the potential for 
widespread abuse to a person-centred approach to decision-making.
In any future work to promote societal change education will be important. Not only 
do we need a competent and confident work force in our hospitals who know the law 
and how to apply it, we also need a much greater understanding within the population 
as a whole. One can only give informed consent if one is truly ‘informed’. But this is 
an area of life where there are many “unknown unknowns” as memorably suggested 
by Donald Rumsfeld. Indeed, the concept of informed consent is hotly contested 
(Parker and Ashencaen Crabtree, 2016). What is needed in respect of advance 
decisions and planning is the amplification of information, the debunking of myths 
and simplifying the process for completion. The authors have referred elsewhere to 
the work of Kitzinger and Kitzinger (2016). The first recommendation from their 
work is the promotion of public health education especially by providing key 
information in public spaces (they suggest a message on the side of a bus).They also 
suggest normalising ADRTs by making information freely available such as is done 
for other illnesses including leaflets and electronic information in doctors surgeries.
However, the need to have ADRTs freely available and accessible for relatives and 
clinicians also needs to be addressed. If a true partnership approach to health and 
social care is adopted this should mean the capacity to lodge advance decisions and 
plans alongside medical records or within an accessible legal repository. There is time 
post-death to identify, read and act upon a Will, there is little such time in respect of 
advance decisions, especially in a pandemic.
Conclusion
It is clear that we need to reform practice and guidance in respect of ADRTs and that 
we see this as a safeguarding issue. If ADRTs are not well understood or ignored then 
individuals are placed at risk of considerable distress through the receipt of unwanted 
treatments. Ignorance also potentially increases clinical deliberation and causes time 
delay when a thorough knowledge of and respect for advance decisions and clinical 
planning allows clinicians to work alongside individuals and families to achieve 
desired outcomes. Whilst psychological and physical harm may result from a failure 
to act on ADRTs, it is perhaps the potential for discriminatory abuse and acting on 
unquestioned assumptions that raises the clearest safeguarding issues. In order to 
avoid such abuse and assumptions we need to ensure clinicians are using advanced 
care planning well, have a good understanding of ADRT and are empowered to 
respect them when valid and applicable.
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As part of a drive to increase awareness and understanding a reflexive approach to 
policy-making and clinical practice is necessary. Thus the assumption of clinician as 
‘expert’ must be subject to critique when it comes to personal decision-making. The 
use of potentially meaningless words such as “reasonable” quality of life as espoused 
by Emanuel et al., needs All clinicians and practitioners should be exposed to 
unconscious bias training, recognising that marginalised groups are often 
discriminated against unknowingly, structurally and through processes and 
procedures. In practice this means that ADRTs should be accorded respect and people 
with no ADRT receive equitable treatment to everyone else regardless of different 
characteristics circumstances and conditions. Whilst an advance decision would, 
therefore, safeguard, not having an ADRT should not place individuals at any greater 
risk because of assumptions made about certain groups.
As Mr Justice Hayden said in Barnsley Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v MSP, “In a 
real sense this is not a case about choosing to die, it is about an adult’s capacity to 
shape and control the end of his life. This is an important facet of personal autonomy 
which requires to be guarded every bit as jealously for the incapacitous as for the 
capacitous.” (paragraph 47)
This paper has argued that we need to move from a professional led health and social 
care service to one where the individual is routinely viewed, at least as a partner, if 
not the decision maker. Highlighting personal autonomy in this fashion should lead to 
better decisions, less abuse and a restoration of trust between professional and patient. 
Such an approach accords well with the Patient and Public Involvement policy 
championed within the NHS (NICE, 2020). It respects the individual and rather than 
detracting from clinical expertise and judgement it allows agreed decisions to be 
reached on what is best for the individual in respect of treatments. Alongside this it 
honours the spirit of ReSPECT for clinicians. Advance decisions and clinical 
decision-making needs to move together to develop partnerships that safeguard the 
person, and by the same token, the clinician. 
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